The Immortality of the Soul: From Socrates (vegetarian) in “Phaedo” by Plato (vegetarian), Part 2 of 2

Let us continue with excerpts from “Phaedo” by Plato (vegetarian), where Socrates (vegetarian) explains to Cebes (vegetarian) and Simmias (vegetarian) that our soul is Divine and aligned with life and thus cannot admit death.

“‘As we just now said. For you know, surely, that whatever things the idea of three occupies must of necessity not only be three, but also odd?’ ‘Certainly.’ ‘To such a thing, then, we assert, that the idea contrary to that form which constitutes this can never come.’ ‘It cannot.’ ‘But did the odd make it so?’ ‘Yes.’ ‘And is the contrary to this the idea of the even?’ ‘Yes.’ ‘The idea of the even, then, will never come to the three?’ ‘No, surely.’ ‘Three, then, has no part in the even?’ ‘None whatever.’ ‘The number three is uneven?’ ‘Yes.’ ‘What, therefore, I said should be defined -- namely, what things they are which, though not contrary to some particular thing, yet do not admit of the contrary itself; as, in the present instance, the number three, though not contrary to the even, does not any the more admit it, for it always brings the contrary with it, just as the number two does to the odd, fire to cold, and many other particulars. Consider, then, whether you would thus define, not only that a contrary does not admit a contrary, but also that that which brings with it a contrary to that to which it approaches will never admit the contrary of that which it brings with it.’

‘Answer me, then,’ He said, ‘what that is which, when it is in the body, the body will be alive?’ ‘Soul,’ he replied. ‘Is not this, then, always the case?’ ‘How should it not be?’ said he. ‘Does the soul, then, always bring life to whatever it occupies?’ ‘It does indeed,’ he replied. ‘Whether, then, is there anything contrary to life or not?’ ‘There is,’ he replied. ‘What?’ ‘Death.’ ‘The soul, then, will never admit the contrary of that which it brings with it, as has been already allowed?’ ‘Most assuredly,’ replied Cebes. ‘What, then? How do we denominate that which does not admit the idea of the even?’ ‘Uneven, ’he replied. ‘And that which does not admit the just, nor the musical?’ ‘Unmusical,’ he said, ‘and unjust.’ ‘Be it so. But what do we call that which does not admit death?’ ‘Immortal,’, he’replied. ‘Therefore, does not the soul admit death?’ ‘No.’ ‘Is the soul, then, immortal?’ ‘Immortal.’[…]”